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Abstract
During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized
adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation
of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [Laird (2012)]) adopt a clas-
sical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA [O’Reilly and Munakata (2000)])
are based on a purely connectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [Sun
(2006)]) adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic repre-
sentational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend
the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical represen-
tations and reasoning are also available [Kurup and Chandrasekaran (2007)].
In this paper we propose a reflection on the role that Conceptual Spaces, a
framework developed by Peter Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors (2000)] more than fif-
teen years ago, can play in the current development of the Knowledge Level in
Cognitive Systems and Architectures. In particular, we claim that Conceptual
Spaces offer a lingua franca that allows to unify and generalize many aspects
of the symbolic, sub-symbolic and diagrammatic approaches (by overcoming
some of their typical problems) and to integrate them on a common ground. In
doing so we extend and detail some of the arguments explored by Ga¨rdenfors
[Ga¨rdenfors (1997)] for defending the need of a conceptual, intermediate, repre-
sentation level between the symbolic and the sub-symbolic one. In particular we
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focus on the advantages offered by Conceptual Spaces (with respect to symbolic
and sub-symbolic approaches) in dealing with the problem of compositionality
of representations based on typicality traits. Additionally, we argue that Con-
ceptual Spaces could offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of
diagrammatic and analogical representations. As a consequence, their adoption
could also favor the integration of diagrammatical representation and reasoning
in CAs.
Keywords: Knowledge Representation, Cognitive Architectures, Cognitive
Modelling, Conceptual Spaces.
1. Introduction
Within the field of cognitive modeling, it is nowadays widely assumed that
different kinds of representation are needed in order of accounting for both
biological and artificial cognitive systems. Examples are the broad class of
neural network representations (including deep neural networks); the vast family
of symbolic formalisms (including logic and Bayesian or probabilistic ones);
analogical representations such as mental images, diagrammatic representations,
mental models, and various kinds of hybrid systems combining in different ways
the approaches mentioned above.
All these methods are successful in explaining and modeling certain classes
of cognitive phenomena, but no one can account for all aspects of cognition.
This problem also holds if we consider some recent successful artificial systems.
For example, the Watson system is based on a probabilistic system able to
reason on enormous amounts of data, but it mostly fails to account for trivial
common-sense reasoning (see [Davis and Marcus (2015)], p. 94). Similarly,
the AlphaGo system [Silver et al. (2016)], based on massive training of deep
neural networks, is impressively successful in the well-defined domain of the
Go game. However, it is not able to transfer its approach in general or cross-
domain settings. In general, this is a classical obstacle of neural networks: in
order to solve a particular problem they need to be trained by a suitable and
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vast training set. Then, however, how to employ the learned strategies to solve
similar problems is still an open issue1.
Based on this evidence, our claim is that the Knowledge Level of cognitive
artificial systems and architectures can take advantage of a variety of different
representations. In this perspective, the problem arises of their integration in a
theoretically and cognitively motivated way. While, in fact, existing hybrid sys-
tems and architectures [Sun (2006)] are able to combine different kinds of repre-
sentations (see for example the class of neuro-symbolic systems [D’Avila Garcez
et al. (2008)]), nonetheless this kind of integration is usually ad hoc based [Chella
et al. (1998)] or, as we will show in the following sections, is only partially satis-
fying. Our hypothesis is that Conceptual Spaces can offer a lingua franca that
allows to unify and generalize many aspects of the representational approaches
mentioned above and to integrate them on common ground.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we report how, in Cognitive
Science research, the problem of conceptual representations intended as a het-
erogeneous phenomenon has gained attention and experimental support in the
last decades. In Section 3, we consider this pluralistic representational stance
in the area of Artificial Intelligence by focusing on some of the most widely
known representational approaches adopted in literature. Section 4 provides a
synthetic description of Conceptual Spaces, the representational framework that
we propose as a lingua franca for the connection of the different representational
levels used in different CAs. In Section 5 we outline the advantages offered by
the Conceptual Spaces representation used as a grounding layer for the classical
AI approaches reviewed in Section 3. In doing so we extend and detail some
of the arguments explored by Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors (1997)] for defending the
need of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic
and the sub-symbolic one. Conclusions end the paper.
1This issue is also explicitly reported by Hassabis in an interview published on Nature
http://goo.gl/9fUy4Z.
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2. Heterogeneity of Representations in Cognitive Science: The Case
of Concepts
In this Section, we present some empirical evidence from Cognitive Science
that favor the hypothesis of the heterogeneity of representations in cognitive
systems and architectures. In particular, we take into account two classes of
evidence concerning conceptual representations: the description of non-classical
concepts (Sect. 2.1) and the application of the dual process distinction to con-
ceptual knowledge (Sect. 2.2).
2.1. Representing Non-Classical Concepts
In Cognitive Science, different theories about how humans represent, orga-
nize and reason on their conceptual knowledge have been proposed. In the
traditional view, known as the classical or Aristotelian theory, concepts are de-
fined as sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Such theory was dominant
in philosophy and psychology from the antiquity until the mid-70s of the last
century, when the empirical results of Eleanor Rosch [Rosch (1975)] demon-
strated the inadequacy of such a theory for ordinary common sense concepts.
These results showed that familiar concepts often exhibit typicality effects. The
results obtained by Rosch have had a crucial importance for the development
of different theories of concepts trying to explain various representational and
reasoning aspects concerning typicality. Usually, such theories are grouped into
three broad classes: (i) the prototype theories, developed starting from the
work of Rosch; (ii) exemplars theories; and (iii) theory-theories (see e.g. [Mur-
phy (2002)] and [Machery (2009)] for a detailed review of such approaches). All
of them are assumed to account for some aspects of the typicality effects in
conceptualization (such as that one of common-sense categorization).
According to the prototype view, knowledge about categories is stored using
prototypes, i.e., representations of the best instance of a category. For example,
the concept CAT coincides with a representation of a typical cat. In the simpler
versions of this method, prototypes are represented as (possibly weighted) lists
of features.
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According to the exemplar view, a category is represented as set of spe-
cific exemplars explicitly stored within memory: the mental representation of
the concept CAT is thus the set of the representations of (some of) the cats
encountered during lifetime.
Theory-theories approaches adopt some form of holistic point of view about
concepts. According to versions of theory-theories, concepts are analogous to
theoretical terms in a scientific theory. For example, the concept CAT is indi-
viduated by the role it plays in our mental theory of zoology. In other versions
of the approach, concepts themselves are identified with micro-theories of some
sort. For example, the concept CAT is a mentally represented micro theory
about cats.
Despite such approaches have been historically considered as competitors,
since they propose different models, and they have different predictions about
how the humans organize and reason on conceptual information, various works
(starting from Barbara Malt [Malt (1989)]) showed that they are eventually
not mutually exclusive. Rather, they seem to succeed in explaining different
classes of cognitive phenomena. In particular, empirical data - i.e., behavioral
measures as categorization probability and reaction times - suggest that subjects
use different representations to categorize. Some people employ exemplars, a
few rely on prototypes, and others appeal to both exemplars and prototypes.
Some representations seem to be more suitable for certain tasks, or for certain
categories. Also, this distinction seems to have also neural plausibility witnessed
by many empirical results (the first in this line is due to Squire and Nolton
[Squire and Knowlton (1995)]).
Such experimental results led to the development of the so-called heteroge-
neous hypothesis about the nature of conceptual representations, according to
which concepts do not constitute a unitary phenomenon. In particular, different
types of conceptual representations are assumed to exist. All such representa-
tions represent different bodies of knowledge associated with the same category.
Each body of conceptual knowledge is thus manipulated by various processes
involved in multiple tasks (e.g. recognition, learning, categorization).
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2.2. Dual-Process oriented Conceptual Representations
A further divide between different kinds of conceptual representations refers
to the dual process hypothesis about reasoning and rationality. According to
dual process theories [(Stanovich and West (2000)], [Evans and Frankish (2009)],
[Kahneman (2011)]) two different types of cognitive processes and systems exist,
which have been called respectively System(s) 1 and System(s) 2.
System 1 processes are automatic. They are phylogenetically older and
shared by humans and other animal species. They are innate and control in-
stinctive behaviors, so they do not depend on training or particular individual
abilities and, in general, they are cognitively undemanding. They are associa-
tive and operate in a parallel and fast way. Moreover, System 1 processes are
not consciously accessible to the subject.
System 2 processes are phylogenetically recent and are peculiar to the human
species. They are conscious and cognitively penetrable (i.e. accessible to con-
sciousness) and based on explicit rule following. As a consequence, if compared
to System 1, System 2 processes are sequential and slower, and cognitively de-
manding. Performances that depend on System 2 processes are usually affected
by acquired skills and differences in individual capabilities 2.
The dual process approach was initially proposed to account for systematic
errors in reasoning. Such errors (consider, e.g., the classical examples of the
selection task or the conjunction fallacy) should be ascribed to fast, associative
and automatic type 1 processes, while type 2 is responsible for the slow and
cognitively demanding activity of producing answers that are correct concerning
the canons of normative rationality.
In general, many aspects of the psychology of concepts have presumably
to do with fast, type 1 systems and processes, while others can be plausibly
ascribed to type 2.
For example, the categorization process based on typical traits (either pro-
2A shared assumption of the dual process hypothesis is that both systems can be composed
in their turn by many sub-systems and processes.
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totypically represented or based on exemplars or theories) is, presumably, a
fast and automatic process which does not require any explicit effort and which
could likely be attributed to a type 1 system. On the contrary, there are types of
inference that are usually included within conceptual abilities, which are slow
and cognitively demanding and which should be attributed to processes that
are more likely to be ascribed to type 2. Consider the ability to make explicit
high-level inferences involving conceptual knowledge, and the capacity to justify
them. Or consider classification: classifying a concept amounts to individuating
its more specific superconcepts and its more general subconcepts, or, in other
words, to identify implicit superconcept-subconcept relations in a taxonomy.
For human subjects such a process is usually slow, it requires great effort, and
it is facilitated by specific training. So, according to the dual process theories,
the inferential task of classifying concepts in taxonomies is prima facie a type
2 process. It is qualitatively different from the task of categorizing items as
instances of a particular class on the basis of typical traits (e.g. the task of
classifying Fido as a dog because it barks, has fur and wags his tail). Therefore,
it is plausible that conceptual representation in cognitive systems should be as-
signed to (at least) two different kinds of components responsible for different
tasks. In particular, type 2 processes are involved in complex and cognitively
demanding inference tasks, and fast and automatic type 1 processes are involved
in categorization based on the common-sense information. A similar theoretical
position is defended by Piccinini [Piccinini (2011)], according to which only two
kinds of concept exist: implicit and explicit; he correlates implicit and explicit
concepts respectively to system 1 and system 2 processes.
More recently, it has been also argued [Frixione and Lieto (2013)] that a cog-
nitively plausible artificial model of conceptual representation should be based
on a dual process approach and, as such, formed by different components based
on various representations inspired by the previous distinction. Some available
systems have been developed based on this hypothesis [Lieto et al. (2015, to
appear 2016)] and integrated with available Cognitive Architectures such as
ACT-R Anderson et al. (2004), and CLARION [Sun (2006)]. In such systems
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the type 1 processes have been demanded to the Conceptual Spaces framework
(Sect. 4), while the type 2 processes have been demanded to standard symbolic
representations (Sect. 3.1). Systems whose conceptual processing activity is
based on the dual process approach have been also recently investigated in the
area of computational creativity of robotic agents [Augello et al. (2016)].
3. Representational Formalisms and Approaches in AI
We claim that the plurality of heterogeneous representations observed in nat-
ural cognitive systems and exemplified in the above section is also recommended
in the design of cognitive artificial systems and architectures. In AI different
types of representational approaches have been proposed and can be successfully
used to model various aspects of the conceptual heterogeneity described above.
In the following, we shortly take into account three primary examples: sym-
bolic representations (Sect. 3.1), neural networks representations (Sect. 3.2),
and diagrammatic and analogical representations (Sect. 3.3).
3.1. Symbolic Representations
Symbolic representations, which in many cases rely on some logic formalism,
are usually well suited for dealing with complex reasoning tasks. Such systems
are characterized by the compositionality of representations: in a compositional
system of representations, we can distinguish between a set of primitive, or
atomic, symbols and a set of complex symbols. Complex symbols are generated
from primitive symbols through the application of suitable recursive syntactic
rules: generally, a potentially infinite set of complex symbols can be generated
from a finite set of primitive symbols. The meaning of complex symbols can
be determined starting from the meaning of primitive symbols, using recursive
semantic rules that work in parallel with syntactic composition rules.
Compositionality has been considered an irrevocable trait of human cog-
nition: in classical cognitive science, it is often assumed that mental repre-
sentations are indeed compositional. A clear and explicit formulation of this
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assumption was proposed by Fodor and Pylyshyn as a criticism of neural net-
works and connectionist systems [Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988)]. They claim that
the compositionality of mental representations is mandatory to explain funda-
mental cognitive phenomena (i.e., the generative and systematic character of
human cognition) and that neural networks are not compositional.
Compositionality is also a characteristic of symbolic artificial systems, and
many knowledge representation formalisms are indeed compositional. In the
field of Cognitive Architectures, for example, SOAR is one of the most famous
systems exploiting symbolic and compositional representations of knowledge
(called chunks) and using pattern matching to select relevant knowledge ele-
ments. This system adheres strictly to the Newell and Simon’s physical symbol
system hypothesis [Newell and Simon (1976)] which states that symbolic pro-
cessing is a necessary and sufficient condition for intelligent behavior. However,
compositionality cannot be easily accommodated with some cognitive phenom-
ena. For example, it is somewhat at odds with the representation of concepts
in terms of typicality [Frixione and Lieto (2011)], as we shall see in greater
details in Sect. 5.1 below. This problem is not limited to the empirical anal-
ysis of natural cognitive systems; it is of main relevance also for the design of
cognitive artificial systems and architectures. The clash between composition-
ality and typicality requirements in symbolic representations is evident the field
of artificial conceptual modelling. Consider, for example, description logics and
ontological languages (e.g. OWL), which are fully compositional but not able to
account for typicality3. At the same time, as mentioned, representing concepts
using typicality is relevant for computational applications (and in particular for
3In the field of logic-oriented Knowledge Representation (KR) various fuzzy and non-
monotonic extensions of description logics formalisms have been designed to deal with some
aspects of non-classical concepts [Giordano et al. (2013)], [Straccia (2002)]. Nonetheless,
various theoretical and practical problems remain unsolved and, in general, an acceptable KR
framework able to provide a practically usable trade-off regarding language expressivity and
complexity has been not yet achieved [Frixione and Lieto (2012)]. (In particular, on fuzzy
logic and typicality effects, see sect. 5.1 below.)
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those of cognitive inspiration). More in general, Fodor and Pylyshyn are true
when they claim that neural networks are not compositional. However, it is also
true that, in the development of cognitive artificial systems and architectures
we do not want to give up with some of the advantages offered by the neural
networks. It is likely that compositionality has to do with higher order cognition
and with complex, type 2, inferential tasks while neural networks are more ap-
propriate to model type 1 phenomena. The problem remains of the interaction
of these two classes of formalisms.
In general, in the symbolic AI tradition, an attempt to mitigate this aspect
has been proposed with the Bayesian networks [Nielsen and Jensen (2009)].
Bayesian networks can be considered as a class of symbolic representations,
where the relations between concepts are weighted by their strength, calculated
through statistical computations. Despite the recent successes of the Bayesian
approach for the explanation of many cognitive tasks [Griffiths et al. (2008)], the
acceptance of explaining intelligence of both natural and artificial minds in terms
of Bayesian Machines is still far from being achieved. Many forms of common-
sense knowledge in human cognition do not require Bayesian predictions about
what will happen or, in general, to reason probabilistically [Sloman (2014)]. In
addition, also in these more sophisticated cases of symbolic representations, the
problematic aspects of reconciling compositionality and typicality requirements
remains, as we shall see in section 5.1, unsolved.
3.2. Neural Networks Representations
Neural networks are a class of representations employed successfully in many
architectures and in many difficult tasks (see for example the AlphaGo system
mentioned above). In general, in the field of CAs, this class of representation
has been widely employed to deal with the fast behavior of a dynamic system
and for aspects mainly related to learning and perception. Neural networks
are particularly well suited for classification tasks. As a consequence, they are
widely adopted in many pattern recognition problems in AI: typical case studies
concern the recognition of handwritten letters and numbers.
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Differently from symbolic representations, neural networks receive input data
directly coming from sensory systems, as images, signals, and so on, and thus
the problem of grounding representations to entities in the external world (which
is notoriously arduous for symbolic systems) is in some sense alleviated. The
importance of neural networks for symbol grounding has been discussed by
Harnad in a seminal paper [Harnad (1990)]. From this point of view, the main
advantage of deep neural networks, and in particular of Convolutional Neural
Networks, is that they are even closer to sensory data, and therefore they need
less or no preprocessing of input data (see, e.g., the recent review by [LeCun
et al. (2015)]).
However, representations based on neural networks are problematic in many
senses. For example, as already anticipated above, it is challenging to imple-
ment compositionality in neural networks [Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988)], [Frix-
ione et al. (1989)]. Moreover, it is unclear how to implement complex reasoning
and planning tasks, which are naturally modeled by symbolic formalisms. As
a consequence, the typical move is to employ some hybrid neuro-symbolic sys-
tems. This is the case, for example, of the ACT-R architecture [Anderson et al.
(2004)], that employs a sub-symbolic activation of symbolic conceptual chunks
representing the encoded knowledge. In some cases, e.g. in ACT-R, this hybrid
approach successfully allows to overcome, in a cognitively grounded perspective,
many problems of the sub-symbolic and symbolic representations considered in
isolation. In other cases, as earlier mentioned, this integration is ad hoc based
and does not provide any explanatory model of the underlying processes in-
tegrating the representations. In any case, however, the classical well-known
problem of neural networks remains their opacity: a neural network behaves as
a sort of black box and specific interpretation for the operation of its units and
weights is far from trivial (on this aspect, see Sect. 5.2).
3.3. Diagrammatic and Analogical Representations
In the last decades, many types of representation have been proposed, both
in Cognitive Science and in AI, which share some characteristic with pictures
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or, more in general, with diagrams and analog representations. Consider for
example the debate on mental images that affects Cognitive Science since the
seventies [Kosslyn et al. (2006)]. According to supporters of mental images,
some mental representations have the form of pictures in the mind.
There are other examples of analog representations besides mental images.
Consider the notion of mental model as proposed by Philip Johnson-Lard [Johnson-
Laird (1983)], [Johnson-Laird (2006)]. According to Johnson-Laird, many hu-
man cognitive performances (e.g. in the field of deductive reasoning) can be
better accounted for by hypothesizing the processing of analog representations
called mental models, rather than the manipulation of sentence-like representa-
tions such as logical axioms and rules. For example, according to Johnson-Laird,
subjects, when performing a deductive inference, first create and merge an ana-
log model of the premises, and then they check the resulting model to draw a
conclusion.
Many pictorial, analog or diagrammatic models have been proposed in vari-
ous fields of Cognitive Science, which take advantage of forms of representations
that are picture-like, in the sense that they spatially resemble to what they rep-
resent (see e.g. [Glasgow et al. (1995)] and, in the field of planning, [Frixione
et al. (2001)]).
This class of representations is heterogeneous, and it is surely not majori-
tarian if compared to the main streams of symbolic/logic based systems and of
neural networks. Moreover, they lack a general theory, and, despite their in-
tuitive appeal, a common and well understood theoretical framework does not
exist. However, in spatial domains, they present various advantages. If com-
pared to sub-symbolic models they are much more transparent; when compared
with symbolic representations, they are often more intuitive, and they avoid the
need of a complete explicit axiomatization. As mentioned above, some attempts
also exists trying to embed diagrammatical representation in CAs [Kurup and
Chandrasekaran (2007)].
From the empirical point of view, none of the above surveyed families of
representations alone is able to account for the whole spectrum of phenomena
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concerning human cognition. This suggests that, also in artificial systems, a
plurality of representational approaches is needed. However, the way in which
these representations interact is not clear both from an empirical point and from
a computational point of view.
4. Conceptual Spaces as a Lingua Franca
Our thesis is that geometrical representations, and in particular Conceptual
Spaces [Ga¨rdenfors (2000)], constitute a common language that enables the
interaction between different types of representations. On one hand, they allow
overcoming some limitations of the symbolic systems (see Sect. 5.1) concerning
both the common sense and the anchoring problems. On the other hand, they
represent a sort of blueprint useful for designing and modelling artificial neural
networks in a less opaque way. Moreover, they provide a more abstract level
for the interpretation of the underlying neural mechanisms (see Sect. 5.2).
Finally, thanks to their geometrical nature, they offer a unifying framework
for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and analogical representation (see
Sect. 5.3).
The theory of Conceptual Spaces provides a robust framework for the inter-
nal representations in a cognitive agent. In the last fifteen years, such framework
has been employed in a vast range of AI applications spanning from visual per-
ception [Chella et al. (1997)] to robotics [Chella et al. (2003)], from question
answering [Lieto et al. (2015)] to music perception [Chella (2015)] (see [Zenker
and Ga¨rdenfors (2015)] for a recent overview). According to Ga¨rdenfors, Con-
ceptual Spaces represent an intermediate level of representation between the
sub-symbolic and the symbolic one. The main feature of a Conceptual Space is
given by the introduction of a geometrical framework for the representation of
knowledge based on the definition of a number of quality dimensions describing
concepts. In brief, a Conceptual Space is a metric space in which entities are
characterized by quality dimensions [Ga¨rdenfors (2000)]. In some cases, such
dimensions can be directly related to perceptual information; examples of this
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kind are temperature, weight, brightness, pitch. In other cases, dimensions can
be more abstract in nature 4.
To each quality dimension is associated a geometrical (topological or metri-
cal) structure. The central idea behind this approach is that the representation
of knowledge can take advantage of the geometrical structure of the Concep-
tual Spaces. The dimensions of a Conceptual Space represent qualities of the
environment independently from any linguistic formalism or description. In
this sense, a Conceptual Space comes before any symbolic characterization of
cognitive phenomena. A point in a Conceptual Space corresponds to an episte-
mologically primitive entity at the considered level of analysis. For example, in
the case of visual perception, a point in a Conceptual Space is obtained from
the measurements of the external world performed, e.g., by a camera, through
the subsequent processing of the low-level vision algorithms.
Concepts are represented as regions in Conceptual Spaces. An important
aspect of the theory is the definition of a metric function. Following Ga¨rdenfors,
the distance between two points in a Conceptual Space, calculated according to a
metric function, corresponds to the measure of the perceived similarity between
4In this paper we will not consider the problem of the acquisition of such representa-
tions. We just mention that there are many successful approaches recently proposed in
Computational Linguistics and Distributional Semantics [Pennington et al. (2014); Mikolov
et al. (2013b,a)] aiming at learning vectorial structures, called word embeddings, from mas-
sive amounts of textual documents. Word embeddings represent the meaning of words as
points in a high-dimensional Euclidean space, and are in this sense reminiscent of Conceptual
Spaces. However, they differ from Conceptual Spaces in at least two crucial ways that limit
their usefulness for applications in knowledge representation. First, word embedding models
are mainly aimed at modelling word-similarity, and are not aimed at providing a geomet-
ric representation of the conceptual information (and a framework able to perform forms of
common-sense reasoning based, for example, on prototypes). Moreover, the dimensions of
a word embedding space are essentially meaningless since they correspond, given an initial
word, to the most statistically relevant words co-occurring with it, while quality dimensions
in Conceptual Spaces directly reflect salient cognitive properties of the underlying domain. In
this sense the word embeddings can be seen an intermediate step between the data level and
the conceptual one in language-oriented technologies.
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the entities corresponding to the points themselves. For example, instances (or
exemplars) of a concept are represented as points in space, and their similarity
can be calculated in a natural way in the terms of their distance according to
some suitable distance measure.
A further aspect of Conceptual Space theory has to do with the role of
convex sets of points in conceptualization. According to the previously cited
work by Rosch Rosch (1975), the so-called natural categories represent the most
informative level of categorization in taxonomies of real world entities. They are
the most differentiated from one another, and constitute the preferred level for
reference. Also, they are the first to be learned by children and categorization
at their level is usually faster.
Ga¨rdenfors proposes the Criterion P, according to which natural categories
correspond to convex sets in some suitable Conceptual Space. As a consequence,
betweenness is significant for natural categories, in that for every pair of points
belonging to a convex set (and therefore sharing some features), all the points
between them belong to the same set, and they share in their turn the same
features.
Natural categories thus correspond to convex regions. In such scenario,
therefore, prototypes and typicality effects taking place at the conceptual level
have a natural geometrical interpretation: prototypes correspond to the geo-
metrical centroid of the region itself. Then, given a certain concept, a degree of
centrality is associated to each point that falls within the corresponding region.
This level of centrality may be interpreted as a measure of its typicality.
Conversely, given a set of n prototypes represented as points in a Conceptual
Space, a tessellation of the space in n convex regions can be determined in the
terms of the so-called Voronoi diagrams [Okabe et al. (2000)]. In sum, one of the
main features of Conceptual Spaces is represented by the fact that, differently
from the models situated at the sub-symbolic and symbolic level, they provide
a natural way of explaining typicality effects on concepts. Their geometrical
structure allows a natural way of calculating the semantic similarity among
concepts and exemplars by using classical topological (e.g., based on the Region
15
Connection Calculus [Ga¨rdenfors and Williams (2001)]) or metrical distances.
Ga¨rdenfors mostly concentrated on the representation of typicality concern-
ing prototypes. However, Conceptual Spaces allow in a natural way the rep-
resentation of non-classical concepts also in terms of exemplars [Frixione and
Lieto (2013)] (as we said above in Sect. 2.1, prototypes and exemplars are two
complementary approaches that can explain different aspects of typicality).
5. On the Advantages of Conceptual Spaces
In the following Sections, we outline some of the advantages offered by Con-
ceptual Spaces representations in dealing with the problems posed by the repre-
sentational formalisms overviewed previously. Such analysis supports our claim
that a grounding of the outlined representations in terms of Conceptual Spaces
could overcome some of their limitations.
5.1. Prototypes and Compositionality in Symbolic Representations
As we anticipated, compositionality can be hardly accommodated with typi-
cality effects. In this Section, we shall argue that Conceptual Spaces could allow
reconciling these two important aspects of conceptual representations. Accord-
ing to a well-known argument ([Fodor (1981)]; [Osherson and Smith (1981)]),
prototypes are not compositional. In brief, the argument runs as follows: con-
sider a concept like pet fish. It results from the composition of the concept pet
and of the concept fish. However, the prototype of pet fish cannot result from
the composition of the prototypes of a pet and a fish: a typical pet is furry and
warm, a typical fish is grayish, but a typical pet fish is neither furry and warm
nor grayish.
Let us consider a version of this argument against the possibility of reconcil-
ing compositionality and typicality effects in symbolic systems that dates back
to Osherson and Smith [Osherson and Smith (1981)]. Osherson and Smith’s
original aim was to show that fuzzy logic is inadequate to capture typicality,
but, as we shall see, the effect of the argument is general. At first sight, fuzzy
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logic seems to be a promising approach to face the problem of typicality. Indeed,
one consequence of typicality effects is that some members of a category C turn
out to be better (i.e. more typical) instances of C than others. For example,
a robin is a better example of the category of birds than, say, a penguin or
an ostrich. More typical instances of a category are those that share a greater
number of characteristic features (e.g. the ability to fly for birds, having fur
for mammals, and so on). The fuzzy value of a predicate (say, F ) could be
interpreted as a measure of typicality. In facts, given two individuals h and k,
it is natural to assume that F (h) > F (k) iff h is a more typical instance of F
than k.
Figure 1: An exemplar of the concept of Polka Dot Zebra
However, let us consider the zebra in Fig. 1 (and let us suppose that her
name is Pina).
Pina is presumably a good instance of the concept polka dot zebra; therefore,
if such a concept were represented as a fuzzy predicate, then the value of the
formula polka dot zebra(Pina) should be close to 1, say:
polka dot zebra(Pina) = .97 (1)
On the other hand, Pina is a rather poor (i.e. atypical) instance of the
concept zebra; therefore the value of the formula zebra(Pina) should be low,
say:
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zebra(Pina) = .2 (2)
(of course, the specific values are not relevant here; the point is that Pina is
more typical as a polka dot zebra than as a zebra). But polka dot zebra can
be expressed as the conjunction of the concepts zebra and polka dot thing; i.e.
in logical terms, it holds that:
∀x(polka dot zebra(x)↔ zebra(x) ∧ polka dot thing(x)) (3)
Now, the problem is the following: if we adopt the simplest and most
widespread version of fuzzy logic, then the value of a conjunction is calculated
as the minimum of the values of its conjuncts. Thus, it is impossible for the
value of zebra(Pina) to be .2 and that of polka dot zebra(Pina) to be .97 at the
same time. Of course, there are other types of fuzzy logic, in which the value
of a conjunction is not the minimum of the values of the conjuncts. However, a
conjunction cannot exceed the value of its conjuncts. Worse still, in general in
logic, once a suitable order has been imposed on truth values, it holds that:
val(A ∧B) ≤ val(A) and val(A ∧B) ≤ val(B) (4)
So, the problem pointed out by Osherson and Smith does not seem to con-
cern fuzzy logic only. Rather, Osherson and Smith’s argument seems to show
that, in general, logic-based representations are unlikely to be compatible with
typicality effects5. Moreover, logic-based representations are paradigmatic ex-
amples of compositional systems, which fully embody the Fregean principle of
compositionality of meaning.
Indeed, the situation is more promising if, instead of logic, we face typi-
cality by adopting a geometrical representation based on Conceptual Spaces.
5The arguments holds also if we consider to model the indicated situation in terms
of a Bayesian network where the strength of the weighted value of the symbolic node
polka dot zebra is assumed to be composed by the values of two nodes zebra and
polka dot thing, as indicated in the example.
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As previously stated, if we represent a concept as a convex area in a suitable
Conceptual Space, then the degree of typicality of a certain individual can be
measured as the distance of the corresponding point from the center of the area.
The conjunction of two concepts is represented as the intersection of the two
corresponding areas, as in Fig. 2.
zebra polka dot thing 
polka dot zebra 
Pina 
Figure 2: Compositionality of Prototypes in Conceptual Spaces
According to the conceptual space approach, Pina should presumably turn
out to be very close to the center of polka dot zebra (i.e. to the intersection
between zebra and polka dot thing). In other words, she should turn out to be
a very typical polka dot zebra, despite being very eccentric on both the con-
cepts zebra and polka dot thing; that is to say, she is an atypical zebra and
an atypical polka dot thing. This representation better captures our intuitions
about typicality. We conclude that the treatment of compositionality and that
of some forms of typicality require rather different approaches and forms of rep-
resentation, and should therefore presumably be assigned to different knowledge
components of a cognitive architecture.
5.2. Interpretation of Neural Networks
As mentioned, neural networks, although successful in many difficult tasks
are particularly well suited for classification tasks and have been widely adopted
in CAs. One of the well-known problems of this class of representations is their
opacity. A neural network behaves as a sort of black box: specific interpretation
is troublesome for the operations of units and weights. In many cases, this is ar-
duous to accept. Let us consider for example the case of medical domain, where
it is not sufficient to classify the symptoms of a disease but it is also required
to provide a detailed explanation for the provided classification of symptoms.
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This problem is much more pressing if we consider the case of deep neural net-
works where, because of the huge number of the hidden layers, there are much
more units and weights to interpret. The opacity of this class of representations
is also unacceptable in CAs aiming at providing transparent models of human
cognition and that, as such, should be able not only to predict the behavior of
a cognitive artificial agent but also to explain it.
A possible way out to this problem is represented by the interpretation of
the network in terms of a more abstract geometric point of view. It is true
that it is feasible to have a simple geometric interpretation of the operation
of a neural network: in fact, the operation of each layer may be described as
a functional geometric space where the dimensions are related to the transfer
functions of the units of the layer itself. In this interpretation, the connection
weights between layers may be described in terms of transformation matrices
from one space to another.
However, while the interpretation of the input and output spaces depends on
the given training set and the particular design of the network, the interpretation
of the hidden spaces is typically tough. However, the literature reports sparse
cases where a partial interpretation of the operations of the units is possible: a
recent example is reported by Zhou [Zhou et al. (2015)]. A more general attempt
to interpret the activity of a neural network in terms of information geometry
is due to [Amari and Nagaoka (2007)].
We claim that the theory of Conceptual Spaces can be considered as a sort
of designing style that helps to model more transparent neural networks, and
it can facilitate the grounding and the interpretation of the hidden layers of
units. As a consequence, the interpretation of neural network representations
in terms of Conceptual Spaces provides a more abstract and transparent view
on the underlying behavior of the networks.
Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors (2000)] offers a simple analysis of the relationship
between Conceptual Spaces and Self Organising Maps. Hereafter, Balkenius
[Balkenius (1999)] proposes a more articulate interpretation of the widely adopted
RBF networks in terms of dimensions of a suitable Conceptual Space. Accord-
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ing to this approach, a neural network built by a set of RBF units can be
interpreted as a simple Conceptual Space described by a set of integral qual-
ity dimensions. Consequently, a neural network built by a set of sets of RBF
units may be geometrically interpreted by a conceptual space made up by sets
of integral dimensions.
Additionally, following the Chorus of Prototypes approach proposed by Edel-
man [Edelman (1995)], the units of an RBF network can be interpreted as
prototypes in a suitable Conceptual Space. This interpretation enables the
measurement of similarity between the input of the network and the proto-
types corresponding to the units. Such an interpretation would have been much
more problematic by considering the neural network alone, since this informa-
tion would have been implicit and hidden. Moreover, it is possible to take into
account the delicate cases of Chimeric entities, which are almost equidistant
between two or more prototypes. For example, a Chimera is a lion with a goat
head, and therefore, it results equidistant between the prototype of the lion and
goat prototypes (see [Edelman (1995)]). This aspect is related to the example
of the polka dotted zebra provided in the previous Section. In this respect, the
capability of accounting for the compositionally based on typicality traits seems
to be a crucial feature of the Conceptual Spaces empowering both symbolic and
sub-symbolic representations 6.
6It is worth-noting that also some forms of neuro-symbolic integration currently developed
in CAs like ACT-R, and belonging to the class of the neo-connectionist approaches, allows
to deal with the the above mentioned problem by providing a series of mechanisms that are
able to deal with limited forms of compositionality in neural networks [O’Reilly et al. (2013)]
and that can be integrated with additional processes allowing the compatibility with typical-
ity effects. In this respect, such approaches play an equivalent role to that one played by the
Conceptual Spaces on these issues. In addition, however, we claim that Conceptual Spaces can
offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and analogical repre-
sentations (see section 5.3). On these classes of representations, limited work has been done
by these hybrid neuro-symbolic systems (including ACT-R) [Matessa and Brockett (2007)].
This is a symptom that the treatment of their representational and reasoning mechanisms
is not trivial in these environments and that often they need to be integrated with external
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Finally, a recent work going in the direction of a more abstract interpretation
of neural representations, and describing how the population of neural repre-
sentations can be interpreted as representing vectors obtained through different
kind of operations (e.g. compression and recursive binding by using circular
convolutions, see [Crawford et al. (2015)],) is obtained by the Semantic Pointers
Perspective adopted by the NEF (Neural Engineering framework) [Eliasmith
and Anderson (2004)] and representing the core of the biologically inspired
SPAUN architecture [Eliasmith et al. (2012)]. Such perspective is completely
compatible with our proposal of providing a more abstract interpretation of
neural mechanisms and representations through multidimensional Conceptual
Spaces.
5.3. Unifying Analogical and Diagrammatic Representations
Analogical and diagrammatic representations allow representing in an effi-
cient and intuitive way kinds of information that would require a very complex
and cumbersome amount of details if explicitly represented by symbolic and
logic-oriented declarative formalisms. Let us consider a simple example that
has been discussed by Philip Johnson-Laird [Johnson-Laird (1983)]. The rela-
tion to be to the right of is usually transitive: if A is to the right of B and B
is to the right of C then A is to the right of C. But consider the case in which
A, B and C are arranged around, say, a small circular table. In this case, it can
happen that C is to the right of B, B is to the right of A but C is not to the
right of A: A and C are opposite (see Fig. 3 below).
To account for such a simple fact by symbolic axioms or rules would require
making explicit a huge number of detailed and complicated assertions. Con-
versely, the adoption of some form of analogic representation such as mental
models associated with suitable procedures, e.g. procedures for the generation,
revision, and inspection of mental models, would allow facing the problem in a
more natural and straightforward way.
diagrammatic representation systems [Matessa and Brockett (2007)].
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A C 
B 
Figure 3: The round table problem
As previously said in Sect. 3.3, a plethora of different kinds of diagram-
matic representations has been proposed without the development of a unifying
theoretical framework. Conceptual Spaces, thanks to their geometrical nature,
allow the representation of this sort of information and offer, at the same time
a general, well understood and theoretically grounded framework that could
enable to encompass most of the existing diagrammatic representations.
The geometrical nature of conceptual spaces can be useful also in repre-
senting more abstract and non-specifically spatial domains and phenomena. A
typical problem of both symbolic and neural representations regards the ability
to track the identity of individual entities over time. The properties of an entity
change across the time. At which condition can we re-identify an entity as the
same, despite its changes? In many cases the answer is not easy. Conceptual
Spaces suggest a way to face the problem. We said that individual objects are
represented by points in Conceptual Spaces. However, in a dynamic perspec-
tive, objects can be rather seen as trajectories in a suitable Conceptual Space
indexed by time, since the properties of objects usually change with time. Ob-
jects may move, may age, an object can alter its shape or color, and so on.
As the properties of an object are modified, the point, representing it in the
Conceptual Space, moves according to a certain trajectory. Since usually this
modifications happens smoothly and not abruptly, several assumptions can be
made on this trajectory, e.g., smoothness, and obedience to physical laws [Chella
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et al. (2004)].
Figuring out the evolution of an object as its future position, or the way
in which its features are going to change, can be seen as the extrapolation of
a trajectory in a Conceptual Space. To identify again an object that has been
occluded for a certain time interval amounts to interpolate its past and present
trajectories. In general, this characteristic represents a powerful heuristic to
track the identity of an individual object. Also in this case, crucial aspects of
diagrammatic representations find a more general and unifying interpretation
regarding Conceptual Spaces.
6. Conclusions
We have proposed Conceptual Spaces as a sort of lingua franca allowing
to unify and integrate on a common ground the symbolic, sub-symbolic and
diagrammatic approaches and to overcome some well-known problems specific
to such representations. In particular, by extending and detailing some of the
arguments proposed by Ga¨rdenfors [Ga¨rdenfors (1997)] for defending the need
of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic and
the sub-symbolic one we have shown how Conceptual Space allow dealing with
conceptual typicality effects, which is a classic problematic aspect for symbolic
and logic-oriented symbolic approaches. Moreover, Conceptual Spaces enable a
more transparent interpretation of underlying neural network representations,
by limiting the opacity problems of this class of formalism, and it may constitute
a sort of blueprint for the design of such networks. Finally, Conceptual Spaces
offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and
analogical representation.
Our proposal may be of particular interest if we consider designing a general
cognitive architecture where all these types or representation co-exist, as it is
also assumed in the current experimental research in Cognitive Science 7. In
7In [Chella et al. (2012)] it is also discussed the possible role that such architectural per-
24
this case, the Conceptual Spaces offer the common ground where all the repre-
sentations find a theoretically and geometrically well-founded interpretation.
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